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Abstract—The management of security and privacy protection
mechanisms is one fundamental issue of future smart grid and
metering networks. Designing effective and economic measures is
a non-trivial task due to a) the large number of system require-
ments and b) the uncertainty over how the system functionalities
are going to be specified and evolve. The paper explores a unified
approach for addressing security and privacy of smart metering
systems. In the process, we present a unified framework that
entails the analysis and synthesis of security solutions associated
with closely interrelated components of a typical smart metering
system. Ultimately, the proposed framework can be used as
a guideline for embedding cross-domain security and privacy
solutions into smart grid communication systems.
Keywords-Smart metering security, smart metering privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART metering (SM) is an important and essential com-ponent of the upcoming new power network, smart grid
(SG). SM can be defined as the communications hardware
and software and associated data management system which
allows collection, processing and distribution of information
between smart meters, customers and utility companies [1].
The importance of SM is that it interconnects SG components
with a two-way communications network to support automated
meter reading (AMR), and real-time optimisations such as
load shedding/management, distributed energy storage (e.g. in
Electric Vehicle, EV) and distributed energy generation (e.g.
from renewable resources).
While the capabilities of communication and information
technologies can allow smart communities to use energy better,
the protection of the SG infrastructure is of major concern.
This is because, unlike the traditional power grid, AMR is
susceptible to attacks which might damage the safety and
reliability of the system.
Risk analysis and impact assessment is a step towards
securing (or upgrading the security of) any system. The
application of such a process is non-trivial in a SM/SG net-
work, considering its architectural complexity, interfacing with
cyber-physical SG functionalities, and the scale of the potential
damages caused by attacks. For example, protection against
unauthorised access and repudiation is a vital requirement for
the AMR data to be trusted by both the utility providers and the
customers. This requires end-to-end communications security,
tamper-proof hardware/software and careful access control.
The requirement for data privacy and data handling is of
particular importance, as SM data infer information about the
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life of individuals. The problem of data privacy preservation
is intrinsic in SM because frequent data collection from
smart meters reveal a wealth of information about residential
appliance usage. Data mining combined with lax controls and
granular SM data collection give rise to a risk of privacy
invasions.
The aim of this paper is to introduce some fundamental
problems of SM security and privacy and combine known so-
lutions into a unified security and privacy protection (USaPP)
framework. We organise our material as follows. Section
II discusses how USaPP contributes to previous work and
the significance of this paper. Section III discusses the idea
of USaPP and describes the SM system and the USaPP
requirements. Section IV introduces a USaPP framework that
organises SM security and privacy measures, and §V concludes
this paper.
II. RELEVANCE
A. Previous work
The scope and perspectives of existing SM/SG security and
privacy framework approaches vary.
A unified key management security scheme for SG can be
found in [2]. This scheme unifies existing standard security
protocols, however the scope of this scheme is limited to
the provision of a communications cryptosystem and does
not involve the study (impact assessment) of other security
components, such as physical security, access control, intru-
sion detection and resilience. A home Intrusion Prevention
System (IPS) is proposed in [3], and its effectiveness is
analysed in different attack scenarios including hacking the
home network originating from the internet and cascading
to a substation, and attacking the human-machine interface.
Further analysis on how (distributed) attacks on load control
command signals, demand side management price signals, or
cloud computation load distribution algorithms might affect
the load to cause malfunctions in the power system can be
found in [4]. However, the above frameworks only focus on
one aspect of SG protection and do not address security and
privacy issues holistically.
A useful survey of SG cyber security and privacy issues
is provided by Liu et al. [5]. The authors discuss threats
originating from components of the system, such as devices
(SMs, EVs, PLCs, RTUs, etc), networking technologies (In-
ternet, sensor networks, etc), management systems (SCADA,
Cipher Key management), anomaly detection systems, and
other interwoven functionalities such as demand response.
Three areas identified for further study are [5]: 1) integrity
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and efficient dispatching and management model for SCADA
system, and 3) establishing a universal policy and standard for
secure communication technology. While the above overview
is quite comprehensive, the is an overlap between different
threat categories and solutions discussed. The need to combine
SG security and privacy problems and solutions and link them
with distinct classes of security systems is the motivation
behind this paper.
Datta Ray et al. recognise the need for a holistic approach
on SG security and they propose a unified risk management
system [6]. This framework considers all the interconnected
vulnerabilities, different performance requirements and secu-
rity priorities in the SG. However, this general methodology
does not discuss particular classes of SG security and privacy
issues; instead it depends on the analysis of such issues in
order to evaluate the risk in different use cases.
B. Contributions
Providing a comprehensive security analysis of SM/SG from
different stakeholders’ point of view is not the objective of
this paper. Instead, this study provides an overview of user-
related SM problems and solutions as the basis for suggesting
a unified approach. We consider the USaPP framework to
be an integrated, holistic approach to the SM/SG security
and privacy problems. One important design requirement for
USaPP is compactness: existing security solutions correspond
to distinct classes of security systems. The benefit of this
framework is that is allows SM/SG security analysis and risk
methodology to be developed in a structured and scalable
manner.
III. RATIONALE AND PRINCIPLES OF USAPP SM SYSTEM
A. The idea of USaPP framework
A unified approach is necessary to study the impact of
an SM/SG attacks. This is because SM/SG is a complex
physical-cyber system where a vulnerability in one subsys-
tem cascades in vulnerabilities in other subsystems. In non-
integrated security systems, complex attacks are typically dealt
with by retrofitting obscure security updates. Such problem
solving approaches have long been proven to be ineffective.
For example, IT systems have long suffered from vulnerable
security software. Such a lax approach is not prudent for SM
networks since SM is likely to be part of a critical energy
infrastructure (i.e. SG). Instead, a unified approach should be
considered from design stage and employed from day one,
using open and tested solutions.
From a user perspective, unification facilitates the integra-
tion of conflicting SM functionalities and system control at
home. For example, energy management and related data flow
relationships could be simultaneously applied from different
domains such as user, utility and third party energy opti-
misation agents. Such relationships become more complex
as micro-generation and EVs are integrated in home SM
networks. Further, USaPP promotes an open market where
users change energy supplier, tariffing, energy management
contracts, or even control software, on a frequent basis (i.e.
daily or less). In such case, both users and stakeholders will
need to have a unified way of ensuring that security and
privacy is maintained during a ‘hand-off’ from one (validated)
component or stakeholder to another. We note that this paper
focuses on the user’s perspective.
The integration of security and privacy is also essential.
This is because privacy depends on security services such as
confidentiality and control. Hence, retrofitting privacy protec-
tion mechanisms may be vulnerable if security services are
not designed appropriately.
In general, as heterogeneous communication systems con-
verge, SM communications will integrate with ad hoc net-
works, the Internet, etc. For example, a roaming SG customer
may wish to initiate an authenticated flow of information
between his home gateway and a remote device. Such data
could, for example, be used to authorise access to remote
facilities. If privacy is required, the customer may also wish
to maintain anonymity. The extrapolation and combination of
multi-domain information such as energy consumption data,
location information, lifestyle information, and other personal
information increase the potential both for richer applications
and services as well as security threats and damages. Future
integration of systems and services require transparent USaPP
by design more than any other time.
The evolution of SM systems also requires scalable and
future proof architectures. For example, consider the case
where the collection frequency of SM data and SM control
functionality change. This change may increase the risk of data
privacy infringements and remote attacks such as impersonated
control messages. A scalable security system should be able
to increase protection levels as required.
B. SM system description
A SM (communication) system consists of the following
components: Smart Meter which primarily measures energy
consumption; Home Area Network (HAN) which is used
for home appliances and devices to communicate; Wide or
Neighbourhood Area Network (WAN/NAN) which connects
HAN to control centres (head-ends) and interested parties; and
Gateway which interconnects HAN with WAN/NAN. Fig. 1
shows the typical SM architecture that is being reflected in
different USA and European standards such as ZigBee, and
ETSI Machine to Machine (M2M) [7].
Optionally, home automation, Home Building Energy Sys-
tem (HBES) and Home Energy Management System (HEMS)
may also be connected to the HAN and interface with the
Smart Meter or Gateway. An In-Home Display (IHD), often
called the Customer Display Unit (CDU), is a special device
that displays data received from the smart meter and optional
sub-meters attached to specific appliances, so that a number
of home sensors and actuators can be brought together to
control and optimise energy consumption. This functionality
may further be used to optimise renewable power generation
and reach carbon savings targets.
There are a number of options available for the communi-
cations outside the home, e.g. between the metering Gateway
and the power distribution network, utility or operators. These
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include cellular technologies, Wireless Mesh/Sensor Networks
(WMN/WSN) and various home broadband solutions. How-
ever, it remains to be seen if utilities and grid operators will
be willing to trust the reliability and independence of some
networks. It is more likely that a mixture of technologies
will be used. For example, data concentrators/aggregators
may collect data from home gateways via wireless networks
and then send them on to the utilities through fixed line
communications.
Two main objectives of SM is to improve demand side
management (DSM) and demand response (DR) in order to
help cut energy costs and adapt to the variability of renewable
power generation. DSM involves giving customers financial
incentives to shift demands (increase elasticity of demand) as
required by the utilities. DSM can effectively be implemented
by collecting and analysing customer energy data, making
energy saving suggestions, and applying real-time pricing.
DR, on the other hand, involves direct control of customer
consumption in order to apply peak demand shaving and uses
SM to remotely control (e.g. switch on/off) home appliances.
C. Fundamental security problems
SG/SM cyber threats, such as the Stuxnet worm, have the
potential to breach national security, economic stability and
even physical security. Power stations and SCADA systems
have always been targeted by hackers; the move from closed
control systems to open IP networks opens up a new range
of vulnerabilities. As previously stated, the study of SM/SG
security is out of the scope of this paper. The keen reader
may refer to the NIST guidelines for SG cyber security [8];
these provide a good starting point and a foundation for SG
security analysis, including security attacks, vulnerabilities,
risks, requirements, solutions, and research problems. Also, a
comprehensive specification of SM security requirements has
been published by OpenSG [1].
This paper focuses on the information security of the home
SM system as described in §III-B. The SM system may
be attacked from many different entry points. For exam-
ple, data integrity and authentication may be compromised
through network attacks such as man-in-the-middle spoofing,
impersonation, or Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Similarly,
data security may be compromised by sabotage/insider attacks
such as viruses and trojan horses. The later threat becomes
significant considering the openness of the SM system and its
interconnections with different networks such as NANs and
the Internet.
Once an entry point is found, it becomes easier for the
attacker to cascade an attack down the SM system. For exam-
ple, compromising the real-time pricing channel may result in
energy theft or malicious remote control of appliances. Hence,
rigorous hardware/software security is required SM to ensure
the validity of different communicating parties such as SM
head-ends and Smart Meters. Further, consider an attacker
takes over the head-end and sends all meters a DR control
message to interrupt supply. The interruption can be made
permanent by also commanding all meters to change their
crypto keys to some new value only known to the attacker
[9]. The impact can be enormous: millions of homes are left
without power until they are locally replaced or re-flashed with
authentic keys, people suffer, health and safety is jeopardised,
businesses lose millions. SM security needs to a) prevent such
attacks from happening and b) have a recovery/survivability
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D. Fundamental privacy problems
The notion of privacy is complex and is perceived and
defined in different ways in different countries and cultures.
Privacy is associated with the notion of personally identifiable
information (PII) that may be contained in or linked with
certain data. In this direction, we would like to use the notion
privacy in the context of the following two notions.
• Anonymity is a property of how sufficiently the identity
of a user associated with a message is hidden (rather than
the message itself).
• Undetectability is a property of how a particular item of
interest (IOI) associated with a message, is sufficiently
distinguished whether exists or not.
The SM privacy problem stems from the potential of a
Smart Meter to measure energy consumption in much more
detail than a conventional meter. Smart meters are expected
to provide accurate readings automatically at requested time
intervals (e.g. every few minutes) to the utility company,
electricity distribution network or to the wider SG, to facilitate
DSM and DR. Such detailed energy usage can be used
to deduce detailed information about appliance usage and
lifestyle patterns, as discussed in [10].
The importance of SM privacy and compliance with data
privacy regulations has recently been highlighted in the
Netherlands, in 2009, where the consumers’ association forced
the government to back off from smart meter installations
until data privacy issues are resolved. According to the Dutch
model, SM privacy requires technical specifications and justi-
fication for SM data collection and handling and provision of
explicit, informed and voluntary consent. Vague assurances of
privacy (by the government) are undesirable as they often lead
to regulatory capture and irrecoverable data misuse damages.
IV. PRELIMINARY SM USAPP FRAMEWORK
A. Overall architecture
Given the system requirements outlined in §III, in this
section we propose a USaPP framework with an emphasis on
home solutions, as illustrated in Fig. 2. However, we do not
preclude the adoption of the proposed framework in a broader
SM/SG security system.
We organise SM USaPP solutions in the following three
classes.
• Communications security. This class involves two distinct
communication systems: a) in-home HAN, HEMS, and
HBEMS, and b) WAN/NAN, including WMN/WSN.
• Secure computing. This class involves the hardware and
software security systems integrated in different SM
components that can operate SM system functions such
as energy and cyber system control, including communi-
cations.
• System control. This class involves the SM functions
and the variables (user input, rules, policies or decision
making algorithms) that drive computing or communi-
cation USaPP operations. This class is responsible for
deciding what security services are needed for different
functions and where/how different data is protected and
communicated. That is, this class is responsible for con-
figuring home SM operations and resolving conflicting
requirements (e.g. energy saving vs. privacy vs. user
overrides vs. SG overrides).
Each class integrates both security and privacy protection
measures and comprises three sub-classes, which are outlined
in Fig. 2 and further discussed in the remainder of this section.
B. Communications security
1) Cryptosystem: Remote access and control within an SM
system, such as DR functionality, may involve a) heteroge-
neous private or public networks, such as the TCP/IP-based
networks (Internet) and WMNs, b) many different devices,
such as sensors, access points and Smart Meters, and c)
different actors, such as utilities and customers. Communi-
cations security for such systems entails key management in
different security domains. However, all NAN/WAN sensors
and Smart Meters of a city may all need to be integrated
in a single security cryptosystem involving maintenance of
possibly millions of cryptographic keys and other credentials.
Hence, SM communications security needs to combine large-
scale, economic key management and cryptography that can
be carried out effectively on devices with limited processing
power.
The design of an SM key management system is an
active area of research. This could for example be based
on existing systems such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
and Identity-Based Encryption (IBE). IBE, in particular, is
attractive as it can be deployed without prior configuration
of the cryptosystem. This is because the identity (ID) of a
device is used to generate unique keys. This allows easy
deployment of low powered devices such as sensors because
they may start sending secure messages without the need to
contact a key server. In general, a mixture of hierarchical,
decentralised, delegated or hybrid security schemes may be
feasible. Preferably, a candidate scheme should include secure
bootstrapping protocols, i.e. it should provide effective means
to initialise new devices. Further, critical security operations,
such as key updates, should preferably employ group key
management techniques, such as ‘defence in depth’ techniques
used in nuclear or military control systems, to mitigate the
impact of compromised head-ends (or trusted people).
2) Routing security: Network routing architecture has an
impact on security. For example, consider a NAN implemented
using WSN, as in Fig. 3. In this case, a number of intermediate
aggregators are used to optimise bandwidth usage and increase
network reliability. If an end-to-end encryption scheme is
employed, aggregation in intermediate wireless nodes can
be as simple as concatenation of encrypted data. Alterna-
tively, secure aggregation is feasible using additive privacy
homomorphism protocols. End-to-end security ensures that
data security services are resilient to compromised or rogue
intermediate nodes. Further, link layer (MAC/PHY) hop-by-
hop security may be required to protect against DoS attacks
such as flooding attacks. For example, 6LoWPAN security
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may provide some security services such as integrity and
authentication.
We note that WAN/NAN design may need to address
stringent reliability requirements, such as 200 ms latency
guarantees, whereas HAN may be less demanding. Both
networks, however, will employ authentication and privacy
control mechanisms to prevent eavesdroppers and attackers
from interfering with the system.
3) Network privacy: Privacy protection requires standard
security services such as confidentiality, authentication and
access control. Such security services are required both when
a private message needs to be communicated and processed or
stored in computing systems. However, that kind of measures
may not suffice. For example, end-to-end communications
security may only guarantee message payload protection.
Private information may still be exposed from ‘shallow packet
inspection’ (e.g. analysis of IP addresses), which is feasible
in WMNs such as 6LoWPAN. That is, privacy also requires
network anonymity, as defined in §III-D. In such cases, privacy
can be further protected by developing network mixes such as
onion routing.
The implementation of effective network anonymity ser-
vices depends on the network architecture. For example con-
sider the WSN in Fig. 3. In such network, anonymity may
be accomplished if data aggregators are used as anonymisers.
Similarly, in a broader SM network system, different gradients
of SM data anonymity may be achieved as SM data is cascaded
in downstream systems. This can be engineered by effectively
removing different degrees of privacy information from SM
data in intermediate systems/aggregators.
Finally, we note that an SM aggregator may also offer
undetectability (as defined in §III-D). For example, the su-
perposition of the metered load signatures of (sufficiently)
large blocks of homes will effectively reduce the probability
in detecting a particular IOI such as the operation of a TV set.
C. Secure computing
1) Hardware and software security: Secure computing
solutions involve the protection of programmable hardware
components, including software and firmware. Security holes
such as backdoors and software bugs may allow hackers to
compromise standard cyber security solutions such as crypto-
graphic protocols offering authentication, access control and
accountability (AAA).
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SM systems may include complex computing platforms
such as operating system (OS) running on personal computers.
Such devices need to employ well-designed OS/application
security architectures such as firewalls, to protect against
both malware and poor user practices, such as poor storage
of important cryptographic keys, poor user/system trust and
password management, and social engineering.
The SM system should be resilient to both insider and
incoming attacks from open interfaces and give access per-
missions to authorised parties as appropriate. For example
access rights may be managed by a Digital Rights Manage-
ment (DRM) system. Also, applications may communicate on
complex distributed programming platforms such as mobile
agents; this requires suitable mobile code security measures.
Finally, the system should be undergoing continuous exhaus-
tive analysis testing, bug fixing and updating.
2) Physical-cyber security analysis: A holistic approach
should be taken to analyse USaPP of the SM system. For
example, SM communications security vulnerabilities can di-
rectly compromise billing, HEMS and DR functionalities, and
grid stability. Hence, SM security should be integrated to
address problems in both the cyber and energy domains. It is
particularly important to design a unified intrusion detection
system that will monitor and analyse both cyber and energy
events, such as potential attacks and impacts. For example,
intrusion detection checks may include key management and
routing protocol operations, packet headers and payloads,
security logs, traffic statistics, wireless signals, system and data
integrity. Additionally, honeypots may be used to isolate and
analyse attacks.
Fig. 4: Redundant measurement system to verify the integrity
of the reported measurements.
In such complex computing, communications and energy
management environment, it is important to simulate risks of
the broader SM/SG system. That is, cascaded risk should be
evaluated, whereby compromise of one system leads to com-
promise of a downstream system. A risk analysis model should
be able to detect both proactive and reactive system anomalies
and take appropriate measures such as create appropriate logs
and alerts.
3) Reliability and availability: The reliability and avail-
ability of energy, in the physical sense, probably form the
most core security requirements. However, it is wrong to
consider data integrity and confidentiality less important, as
such security services may be cross-correlated. For example,
lack of data integrity may yield unreliable billing. Even worse,
compromised data AAA may allow intruders to manipulate
SM appliances and even cause physical damages (e.g. one
could force the gas heaters to operate on full power), let
alone potential greater SG threats such as substation sabotages
leading to system breakdown and widespread energy black-
outs (which we do not study here).
Reliability can be induced by means of redundancy. One
such example is depicted in Fig. 4 where the integrity of
gathered billing data X can be verified if an integrity check Y
is fed back to be compared with X. Sending back Y instead
of X increases the level of security when Y is sent over an
untrusted network.
Survivability functionality needs also to be in place to
handle emergency situations when critical security services
fail. Solutions may involve the addition of system redundancy
functionality such as different ways to access system compo-
nents. For example, a home gateway may be simultaneously
be accessed through different communication networks. Also,
critical devices may be accessed by more than one gateways
or access points. Finally, multiple parties, such as delegates
and escrow services may be used to add diversity in AAA
services. In such cases, critical devices may need to maintain
multiple (backup) crypto keys.
D. System control
1) Private data handling: Secure data handling requires
transparent policies, trust management and compliance en-
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dling include Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), which
may employ a variety of cryptographic or anonymity proto-
cols. For example, PETs may be based on standard ‘privacy
principles’ such as notice and purpose, choice and consent,
collection and scope, use and retention, access, disclosure to
third parties and limited use, security for privacy, quality, and
monitoring and enforcement [11]. Access to data should be
controlled with cryptographic protocols.
PETs could also be used to assess privacy risks and mod-
erate SM data communication and handling. SM privacy risk
may be quantified by analysing the leakage or exposure of PII
to different parties. Privacy protection risk assessment depends
on privacy parameters such as a) the value of data, b) the
ownership of data, c) data access and usage permissions given
to different parties, d) the degree data owner trusts such other
parties with the data.
Harmonising privacy regulations across different legal sys-
tems and cultures is not easy. For example, in the USA there
are 51 different standards for privacy: one for each one of the
50 states plus one federal standard. Regarding data ownership,
each state has different rules: in some states it is the individual,
in some others the electrical company, and in others a third
party.
We note that trusting stakeholders for complying with regu-
lations is not a panacea for protecting privacy. This is because
regulations are often equivocal and not easily enforced. History
(e.g. of Internet) teaches that ‘legitimate’ data mining and
exploitation techniques evolve quickly when there are financial
incentives. To overcome this problem it is desirable to define
a common, unified language in order to design validated
contractual customer-stakeholder relationships in a structural
manner.
2) Spheres of control: Spheres of control are useful to
mitigate vulnerabilities by giving different levels of control
to different trusted parties for different data or functionality.
For example, we suggest that private data could be segregated
into the following categories.
• Customer data: These could be low frequency attributable
data such as data used for billing.
• Technical data: These could be high frequency SM data
such as data supporting DR/DSM.
• Strictly personal data: These could be per unit data
sampled at the highest frequency used for personal or
private business purposes.
Each data category could be communicated to different
stakeholders as required. For example, the Expert Group 2 of
the European Task Force Smart Grids [12] has recommended
that technical SM data should be anonymised with means of
data aggregation, as discussed in §IV-B3.
Apart from using aggregation, data privacy and control may
be further advocated with the introduction of trusted third par-
ties, such as escrows. The benefit here is that an independent
escrow service allows secure end-to-end aggregation of SM
data payloads in a very scalable manner.
An escrow-based anonymisation scheme proposed in [13]
introduces a structural difference to a smart meter within
which two separate IDs are embedded, as depicted in Fig. 5:
Fig. 5: Smart meter hardware architecture containing a) a
Personally Identifiable SM (PISM) Profile and b) an Anony-
mous SM (ANSM) Profile. Each profile contains: a Certificate
(CERT), corresponding hardware ID, Public Key, Private Key
(PRIV), and root Certifying Authority (CA) data. The two
profiles are used to create or update a Client Data Profile
(CDP) and an Anonymous Data Profile (ADP).
one anonymous, High-Frequency ID (HFID) and one at-
tributable Low-Frequency ID (LFID). The idea is to use HFID
to send technical data, and LFID to send customer data. The
idea here is that HFID will never be known to the utility;
however, the utility can verify the integrity and authenticity of
associated messages with the help of the escrow.
We note that multiple-ID hardware architectures, as in
Fig. 5, may support a) escrow anonymisation discussed here,
b) group key management protocols for attack impact mit-
igation discussed in §IV-B1, or c) backup keys trust for
emergency hardware control discussed in §IV-C3. This again
illustrates the importance for having a USaPP design.
3) Secure energy management: The concept of privacy via
undetectability discussed in §III-D adopts the fundamental
assumption that hiding home appliance usage patterns is a
matter of ‘privacy of personal behaviour’, i.e. “the right of
individuals to keep any knowledge of their activities, and
their choices, from being shared with others” [11]. In this
context, SM privacy can be studied as an undetectability
property of appliance load signatures [14]. Undetectability can
effectively be enforced by controlling the energy flow within
a home so that a portion of a consumption demand runs off a
rechargeable battery, rather than directly off the grid, as seen
in Fig. 6. The battery system may manage energy flow in a
manner advantageous to customer privacy by masking load
signatures in a way that makes it harder to detect appliance
usage patterns.
From the above it becomes clear that HEMS decision
making algorithms can effectively impact SM data privacy.
However, the degree to which this it true depends on deployed
spheres of control discussed in §IV-D2. It is also clear that
private energy management may conflict with other SM func-
8Fig. 6: The battery is discharged/recharged with power pB(t)
in order to ‘disguise’ a given consumption load p(t). The smart
meter records a power trace pi = p− pB − pL, where pL(t)
is the power lost within the battery.
tionality such as DR/DSM or energy pricing arbitrage.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The interconnection of cross-disciplinary systems, such as
HEMS, HBES, HAN and WSN, the need to collect and
analyse detailed SM data, the support for various SM func-
tionalities, such as real-time pricing, DR and DSM, and the
involvement of multiple stakeholders (e.g. consumers, utilities,
grid operators, third-party service providers) make SM systems
highly complex. Equally complex is the analysis of security
and privacy attacks that may cascade from one SM system
domain into another. In this paper we have presented the
case for a unified approach that attempts to address home SM
security and privacy requirements by fusing different solutions
and mapping them to a number of tightly inter-related system
components. In particular, by classifying discussed solutions
into three logical domains, namely, communications, com-
puting and system control, the proposed USaPP framework
addresses the SM network security and privacy issues in a
holistic manner. We believe that the proposed USaPP frame-
work can be used as a guideline for SG network designers and
risk analysts. Future work will focus on many of the technical
solutions embedded in different domains of the framework.
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